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The Social Security trust fund is predicted to be depleted by 2041.  While there are several viable 
reform proposals to restore long-term solvency of the Social Security system, one important 
element that is critical to the success of any reform remains unknown:  how will individuals 
respond to, for example, a cut of their Social Security benefits.  Will they work longer or save 
more or both, and to what extent will their response make up for the cut in benefits?  In this 
paper we use data from the HRS Internet Survey where we asked respondents directly what they 
would do if everyone’s Social Security benefits were cut by 30 percent.  At a qualitative level, 
we find important differences in the response by sex, marital status, and SES, among others.  We 
conduct a detailed quantitative analysis of response to timing of Social security claiming and find 
that on average individuals would postpone claiming Social Security by 1.13 years.  If this time 
was spent working by everyone then the annual Social Security benefit would drop on average 
by 20 percent rather than the initial 30 percent imposed by the reform.  In other words the 
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 1.  Introduction 
The Social Security trust fund is predicted to be depleted by 2041.  While there are 
several viable reform proposals to restore long-term solvency of the Social Security 
system, one important element that is critical to the success of any reform remains 
unknown:  how will individuals respond, for example, to a cut of their Social Security 
benefits?  Will they work longer or save more or both, and to what extent will their 
response make up for the cut in benefits?  How would the adjustment be split across 
spending less and working longer?   
It is important to understand how workers might respond to a benefit cut for at 
least two reasons.  First, to evaluate its impact on the well-being of individuals, i.e., 
whether responses in behavior will be adequate to buffer the shortfalls in benefits and 
whether this would be the case across all groups of workers. Second, the response in 
individuals’ behavior determines the size of benefit cuts required for a reform of Social 
Security.  If all workers decided to work longer to make up for the shortfall then Social 
Security revenues would increase more than if workers decided to make up for the 
shortfalls by reducing spending, but otherwise sticking with their retirement (and Social 
Security claiming) plans in the absence of reform.  For some workers additional Social 
Security contributions would only result in a minor increase of their annual Social 
Security benefits whereas for others the increase in benefits would be larger, depending 
on the worker’s earnings history.   
Despite the relevance from a policy perspective, very little is known about how 
people would adjust their behavior in case of a reform that would decrease their Social 
Security benefits.  Workers have two main ways to respond:  they can work longer and/or 
save more. In the absence of additional constraints, economic theory predicts that 
individuals should adjust both their saving and the length of their working life.  However, 
it has been difficult to show empirically how important each one of these dimensions is 
and how these interact. Most studies focus on only one dimension of adjustment, either 
on the response to savings or on the response to labor force participation, but rarely on 
both.  Broadly speaking, there are three types of empirical studies on this topic:  within 
country studies, cross-country studies, and those adopting a structural approach.   An 
important challenge for within country studies is that there tends to be no exogenous 2 
 
variation in Social Security rules that could be exploited unless there is a major reform 
and adequate data covering the period before and after.  However, policy makers would 
like empirical studies to inform the design of a reform before enacting it, rather than 
after.  They therefore have to contend with evidence from other countries that have 
implemented reforms.  Examples of within country studies are Attanasio and Rohwedder 
(2003) for the U.K., Attanasio and Brugiavini for Italy (2003), or Aguila (2008) for 
Mexico.  Cross-country studies rely on variation in institutions, in particular retirement 
ages and pension formulas, as exogenous variation to identify the effects of interest.  
Gruber and Wise (1999 and 2004) adopt this approach to study the impact on labor force 
participation.  Hurd, Michaud and Rohwedder (2008) use institutional variation in public 
pension schemes across countries to study variation in wealth accumulation.   
Another way to assess individuals’ responses to Social Security reform is to 
estimate a structural model and conduct policy simulations as in Gustman and Steinmeier 
(2007), but this is done at the cost of having to limit the set of covariates to keep the 
model tractable.  
In this paper, we adopt a very different approach: we ask respondents directly 
what they will do in case of a cut of 30 percent of their Social Security benefits: whether 
they would work longer, claim Social Security later, reduce spending before retirement, 
and/or reduce spending after retirement.  For each of these options we follow-up with 
questions to assess the size of the response.  The success of such stated preferences 
questions to elicit responses that are as close as possible to individuals’ actual behavior 
depends critically on the saliency of the event for respondents and whether they have 
already considered the scenario as a real possibility (McFadden, 1998).  We argue that 
this is clearly the case in our context.  The need for Social Security reform to restore the 
solvency of the program has been well advertised in the media and by political leaders for 
a number of years.  Time and time again the message is repeated that under current law 
benefits will only be payable until about 2041.  After that date only about 75 percent of 
benefits will be payable under the current structure of the system.  Also workers’ Social 
Security statements that are mailed out every year include this same message in bold 
face.   3 
 
We collected these new data from a sub-sample of respondents to the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) who were interviewed over the Internet in the summer of 2007.  
We link their answers to the rich background information collected in the HRS core 
survey and to administrative Social Security earnings records.   
We find that more than 75 percent of our respondents would definitely adjust their 
behavior in case of a 30 percent cut of their Social Security benefits. About a third report 
that they would only reduce spending, while another third report that they would both 
work longer and reduce spending, underscoring the importance of considering these 
options jointly. At a qualitative level, we find important differences in the response by 
sex, marital status, and socioeconomic status. Being male, living in a couple or being 
younger than 54 are associated with a significantly lower willingness to commit to 
reducing spending, while having an education at high school level or less and being in the 
lowest wealth tertile are associated with a higher willingness to commit to reducing 
spending. Working longer is more likely among respondents in the lowest Social Security 
Wealth tertile and the lowest tertile for other wealth, and less likely among couples.   
  We conduct a more detailed quantitative analysis of respondents’ answers 
regarding delaying their claiming of Social Security benefits.  On average Social Security 
claiming would be postponed by 1.13 years.  If this time was spent working by everyone 
then the annual Social Security benefit would be adjusted upward due to additional 
earnings and due to less of an early claiming penalty or a higher delayed claiming credit.  
Rather than experiencing a 30 percent drop in the annual benefit, respondents would 
experience a 20 percent drop on average when taking into account their adjustments to 
claiming later and working longer. 
 
 
1  Data:  The HRS Internet Survey 
The data on individuals’ responses to a 30 percent Social Security benefit cut come 
from a module of the Health and Retirement Study Internet Survey which is a 
supplementary survey of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  The HRS is a panel 
survey that is representative of the U.S. population age 51 and over.  In the core survey 
the HRS collects data on close to 20,000 individuals and their spouses in about 13,000 4 
 
households.
1  Eligibility for the second wave of the HRS Internet Survey, which we use 
in this study, is determined by whether a respondent reports regularly using the Internet 
in the core survey in HRS 2004 or HRS 2006.  A random sub-sample of 7,207 
respondents qualified, but only 77.5 percent were invited to participate in the Internet 
Survey; the remainder of the sample was retained as a control group.
2  The data for the 
second wave of the HRS Internet Survey was collected in two phases: the first part of the 
sample (34.4 percent or 1,919 respondents) was invited to participate in the spring of 
2006 (Phase I) and the second part of the sample (65.6 percent or 3,667 respondents) was 
invited to participate in the summer of 2007.
3  In both phases the unit response rate, 
conditional on being invited to participate, was 70%.
4    We administered the module on 
Social Security reform in the second phase.  A great advantage of the HRS Internet 
survey is that we can link respondents to the very rich information collected in the core 
HRS survey, such as earnings or job history.   
The HRS Internet survey sub-sample eligible to answer the module on stated 
preferences is composed of respondents who at the time of interview did not yet receive 
Social Security benefits, but report a positive probability of receiving Social Security in 
the future. To find how representative the HRS Internet sample and our stated preferences 
sample are compared to the entire HRS population we compare their characteristics in 
Table 1.   The first column shows the characteristics of respondents from the 2006 HRS 
core who do not currently receive Social Security benefits, the second column restricts 
the sample to those who are eligible to participate in the HRS Internet survey (wave II, 
phase 2) and do not receive Social Security benefits and the third column only includes 
our stated preferences sample. It shows that the stated preference sample and the Internet 
sample are closely comparable.  Compared to all HRS respondents they tend to be 
                                                 
1 More precisely, in 2004 the HRS interviewed 20,129 individuals in 13,645 households achieving a 
response rate of 87.8%; in 2006 HRS interviewed 18,469 individuals in 12,605 households and the 
response rate was 88.9%. 
2 The purpose of the control group is to allow HRS to study potential effects of participation in the Internet 
Survey on participation in subsequent interviews of the core survey. 
3 The reason for postponing the interview to a later second phase for one group of the sample was that this 
group had been previously assigned (at random) to participate in another supplemental study and would 
have had three HRS-related interviews within months of each other had their internet interview not been 
postponed. 
4 There were no breakoffs in phase I; however, in phase II a total of 60 respondents did not complete the 
entire survey. 5 
 
slightly more educated and wealthier, but the differences are rather small.  While 
generally Internet samples tend to be more educated and wealthier than the general 
population, which is also true in the case of the entire HRS Internet sample, this is not the 
case in our analysis.  The reason is that we focus on respondents who do not yet receive 
Social Security, implying that our sample consists mostly of respondents age 65 or 
younger.  At these younger ages there are no large differences by characteristics between 
Internet users and non-users.  Note that the stated preference sample is not completely 
comparable to the other samples because the stated preference sample retains only 
respondents who report a positive subjective probability of receiving Social Security in 
the future and excludes those who report 0%. This subjective probability is not elicited in 
the core HRS (rather, a yes/no format question is asked) so that we cannot replicate the 
selection in an identical manner. Some of the differences in characteristics might 
therefore also be explained by this different selection criterion.  
 
1.1  Survey Design 
After a sequence of questions about respondents’ expectations regarding their future 
Social Security benefits (timing of claiming and monthly amounts) we ask respondents 
how they would respond to a cut to Social Security benefits of 30 percent. In particular, 
we provide respondents with the following introduction: 
 
In the next questions, we ask you to think about what you would do differently if 
everyone’s Social Security benefits, including your own, were cut by 30 percent.  
Would you …?   
 
  Figure 1 replicates the screen that respondents see on the survey and shows the 
various options presented to them: work longer (or return to work for respondents 
currently not working), claim Social Security benefits later, spend less before retirement 
or spend less after retirement. All options are purposely appearing on the same screen to 
ensure that respondents consider them jointly when answering.  Respondents can answer 
“Definitely Yes”, “Definitely No” or “Maybe” for each option. The answer “Maybe” is 6 
 
introduced to allow for the fact that some respondents might still be uncertain about what 
they will do since their adjustment to a cut might depend on events that are not yet 
realized, such as health events, uncertainty about future earnings, stock market 
performance or job loss.  
  Item non-response on any of the options asked on the first screen is very low (see 
Table 2). It is less than 3 percent throughout, and less than 2 percent among respondents 
currently working for pay. 
 
  For each option to which they responded by “Definitely Yes” or “Maybe” we 
administered follow-up questions to elicit the magnitude of the adjustment that the 
respondent would envision: 
 
-  Work longer: At what age would you expect to stop working?  
-  Claim Social Security later: At what age would you expect to start collecting 
Social Security benefit? 
<We also collected a detailed visual elicitation of the subjective probability of 
claiming at various possible claiming ages.> 
-  Spend less before retirement: By how much would you reduce your household 
spending? (answer in percent or amount in dollars) 
-  Spend less after retirement: By how much would you reduce your household 
spending in retirement compared to what you had anticipated it would be without 
the cut in Social Security benefits? (answer in percent or amount in dollars) 
 
 
1.2  Analytical sample 
  There are 1,020 observations in the stated preference sample.  We exclude from 
the analysis in this paper respondents who are not currently working for pay (that is 178 
observations) because this group responds in a very different manner to the Social 
Security benefit cut compared to those who are working for pay.  However, the sample of 
non-workers is not big enough to study its responses in much detail. We therefore focus 7 
 




1.3  Basic Response Patterns 
  Table 3 shows respondents’ answers to the options “work longer” and “claim 
Social Security later.” Working longer is undeniably an option considered by the vast 
majority of respondents in response to a 30 percent cut in benefits: 38 percent answered 
that they would definitely work longer, while 49 percent answered “Maybe.” Only 13 
percent completely disregard working longer as a potential adjustment. The answers to 
claiming Social Security later than originally planned follow a similar pattern: 22 percent 
answer “Yes” and 60 percent say “Maybe.”  In addition, respondents who answered 
“Yes” or “Maybe” to one of these adjustments tend to provide “Yes” or “Maybe” to the 
other. For example, among respondents who report “Definitely Yes” for claiming later, 
82% also report “Definitely Yes” and 16% report “Maybe” to working longer. Similarly, 
respondents who answered “No” to one question are more likely to answer “No” to the 
other. 
  Table 4 shows the answers to the options “spending less before retirement” and 
“spending less after retirement.”  Respondents are more likely to “commit” (i.e., answer 
“Definitely Yes”) to spending less in a longer time horizon, that is after retirement. Sixty-
two percent of the respondents said “Definitely Yes” to reducing spending after 
retirement, compared to 41 percent to reducing spending before retirement. However, the 
difference of patterns of answers between spending less before or after retirement is due 
to complementary variation in the “Maybe”s and not due to large differences in the 
”No”s.  Overall, more than 90 percent of respondents reported “Yes” or “Maybe” for 
spending less before or after retirement. Again, there is strong correlation in respondents’ 
answers to the two options involving reductions in spending:  respondents who answered 
“Yes” or “Maybe” to spending less before retirement are more likely to answer “Yes” or 
“Maybe” to spending less after retirement. 
  If we compare Tables 3 and 4, we conclude that respondents are more likely to 
consider spending less as an option. For example, only 4 percent would definitely not 8 
 
reduce spending after retirement, compared to 13 percent who would definitely not work 
longer.  
  We are interested in examining all adjustment simultaneously.  However, doing 
so is challenging because we consider four different options (work longer, claim Social 
Security later, spend less before retirement, spend less after retirement) and three answer 
categories (Definitely Yes, Maybe, Definitely No). This represents 81 possible 
combinations of answers. As noted earlier, the answers to working longer and claiming 
later are strongly correlated.  In order to reduce the dimensionality, we combine them into 
one category which we will refer to as “working longer.”  Similarly, we found that 
spending less before retirement is correlated to spending less after retirement, so we also 
combine them into a “spending less” category.  Table 5 illustrates the definition of the 
new variables of interest. The variable “Work longer” takes the value one if the 
respondent answered “Definitely Yes” to either “work longer” or to “claim Social 
Security later” and the value zero otherwise.  Similarly, the second variable “reduce 
spending” takes the value one if the respondent answered “Definitely Yes” to either 
“reduce spending before retirement” or to “reduce spending after retirement” and zero 
otherwise. We are then left with analyzing respondents’ four possible options: commit to 
neither adjustment, commit to both, only commit to spending less or only commit to 
working longer. 
  Table 6 shows the distribution of answers among these four options.  The most 
frequent option is to only commit to spending less which is chosen by 34 percent of 
respondents, closely followed by committing to both which is chosen by 33 percent.  The 
least preferred option is only committing to working longer (9 percent).  A larger fraction 
of respondents are willing to commit to spending less (67 percent of respondents) 
compared to 42 percent who are ready to work longer.  
  Table 7 presents the distribution of answers for our analytical sample and 
respondents who are currently not working, that we have excluded from the main 
analysis. It highlights our earlier statement that the sample of respondents who are 
currently not working exhibit very different stated preferences: they are less likely to 
consider working longer (alone or jointly with spending less) as an option.  
 9 
 
2  Multivariate Analysis of Qualitative Response  
  The response to a cut in Social Security benefits is likely to vary by individual 
and household characteristics.  We investigate this in a multivariate framework using a 
bivariate probit model.  This approach takes into account the fact that the decisions of 
whether to work longer or whether to reduce spending are determined jointly.  As before, 
the dependent variable “work longer” takes the value one if the respondent answered 
“Definitely Yes” to either “work longer” or to “claim Social Security later” and the value 
zero otherwise.  Similarly, the second dependent variable “reduce spending” takes the 
value one if the respondent answered “Definitely Yes” to either “reduce spending before 
retirement” or to “reduce spending after retirement” and zero otherwise.  In addition to 
basic demographic characteristics we include among the independent variables tertiles of 
Social Security Wealth and of other wealth.  Social Security Wealth is constructed as the 
expected present value of future Social Security Benefits derived from respondents 
answer to the question “how much do you expect your Social Security benefits to be?”  
Other wealth includes all bequeathable wealth, including housing, financial assets, other 
real estate, transportation, and business assets minus all debt.  It does not include the 
value of Social Security and employer pensions.  Table 8 shows the estimation results.   
  Being male, living in a couple or being in the age band “younger than 54” are 
associated with a significantly lower willingness to commit to reducing spending.  A 
higher willingness to commit to reducing spending is associated with having a spouse 
who is more than a year older, education at high school level or less, being in the lowest 
wealth tertile and giving a high subjective probability that one’s own Social Security 
benefits will be cut some time over the next 10 years.  Saying “definitely yes” to “work 
longer” is significantly more likely among respondents in the lowest Social Security 
Wealth tertile, in the lowest tertile for other wealth and with a high subjective probability 
of one’s own Social Security benefits being cut some time over the next ten years.  
However, couples are significantly less favorable towards working longer.  Note that we 
find no significant differences by the respondent’s own age for working longer.  To 
assess the magnitude of the variation by characteristics we compute the associated 
marginal effects.  Figures 2 through 6 give a graphical representation of the marginal 
effects for the characteristics with significant coefficients in the regression.  Each graph 10 
 
shows the likelihood relative to the reference group of the four combinations of the two 
binary outcomes:  committing to neither; committing only to working longer; committing 
only to spending less, and committing to both working longer and spending less.  They 
illustrate clearly that respondents largely make adjustments along both the working AND 
the spending dimension underscoring the importance of considering these jointly. 
  For example, in Figure 2, respondents in the lowest Social Security wealth tertile 
are over 6 percent more likely to commit to both working longer and spending less than 
the reference group, that is, people in the highest tertile.  Conversely, those in the lowest 
tertile are almost four percent less likely than the reference group to commit to neither.  
As one would expect, the response of those in the second Social Security wealth tertile 
lies in between that of the lowest tertile and the reference group.  The response by tertile 
of other wealth (Figure 3) shows the same pattern, but the magnitudes are larger.  Those 
in the lowest wealth tertile are almost 15 percent more likely to commit to both working 
longer and spending less than the reference group of those in the highest wealth tertile.   
  Comparing the response of males compared to females (Figure 4) we find that 
males overall seem to dislike reducing their spending.  They are more than six percent 
less likely to reduce spending.  They rather commit to working longer (over three percent 
more likely) or commit to neither (four percent more likely).  Figure 5 contrasts the 
response of couples to that of singles and shows that couples are substantially (18 
percent) less likely than singles to commit to adjusting both dimensions, working longer 
and spending less.  Instead, they are 12 percent more likely to commit to neither and 8 
percent more likely to react by spending less. 
  The subjective probability of the respondents’ own Social Security benefits being 
cut some time over the next ten years might reflect to what extent the respondent had 
already thought through the scenario of Social Security cuts prior to the interview.  
Individuals giving a high subjective probability on this question might therefore take the 
hypothetical scenario more seriously than those who give a low probability.  In our 
sample 40 percent assess the chances of their own Social Security benefits being cut to be 
greater than 50 out of 100; 29 percent believe the chances are about 50/50 and the 
remaining 31 percent give a probability that is less than 50 percent.  In the regression we 
distinguish the same three groups of respondents.  Figure 6 shows the estimated marginal 11 
 
effects.  We find that indeed those with a high probability give a much stronger response 
than those with a low probability and that the response of those who give a 50 percent 
chance is in between the two.  Respondents with a subjective probability of future Social 
Security benefits cuts greater than 50 percent are ten percent more likely to commit to 
working longer and spending less than those with a subjective probability of less than 50 
percent, while they are about ten percent less likely to commit to neither.  This could 
imply that if Social Security benefits were indeed cut by 30 percent the response in the 
population might be stronger than the one we estimate, because some fraction in our 
sample might have given less committal answers than if this scenario was real. 
  In summary, we find that there is substantial heterogeneity in the qualitative 
response to a 30 percent Social Security benefit cut, notably by sex, marital status and by 
socioeconomic indicators.  There is also some suggestion that the effects we find might 
be underestimates compared to the response one might find if such a reform was in fact 
implemented.   
 
3  Quantitative Assessment of the Response to Delay Claiming of Social Security 
Benefits 
  We now turn to quantifying individuals’ response with respect to delaying 
claiming Social Security benefits.  We focus on this particular aspect for two reasons: 
first, from the point of view of the Social Security program changes in the timing of 
claiming Social Security affect the finances and cash flow of the Social Security program 
directly and are therefore important in understanding the implications of the reform 
scenario.  Second, the data for measuring the size of the response are the most detailed 
for the option “claim Social Security later.”  
  We asked respondents who answered “Yes” or “Maybe” to the option of claiming 
Social Security later (see Figure 1) for a point estimate of their revised expected claiming 
age and also for the probability distribution of claiming at various possible ages using an 
innovative visual design.  These follow-up questions took the following format (see 
Figures 7 through 9 for replications of the computer screens that respondents saw when 
answering these questions.):   12 
 
 
“You said that you would consider claiming Social Security benefits later than 
originally planned.   
At what age would you expect to start collecting Social Security benefits if Social 
Security benefits were cut by 30 percent? _____ 
<next screen> 
Often people are uncertain about when they will start collecting these benefits.  
On the next screen we will show you 20 balls that you can put in eight different 
bins.  Each bin stands for a particular age.  Please put the balls in the bins to show 
the chances that you will start collecting at each age.   
 
Figure 7 shows the screen that follows where respondents allocate the balls across the 
various bins.  We developed this innovative visual format to elicit individuals’ entire 
probability distribution of beliefs for the realization of an event (see Delavande and 
Rohwedder, 2008, for a methodological assessment of this approach).  A main advantage 
of this approach is that it does not require respondents to be particularly proficient in the 
properties of probabilities; they just need to manage concepts as “more likely,” “less 
likely” and what it means when there is no chance of something to happen.  Respondents 
had a more detailed introduction to this “bins-and-balls” exercise when we elicited the 
same detailed probability distribution of respondents’ expected Social Security claiming 
age, but without the reform scenario, earlier in the survey.  Figure 8 replicates the 
introduction to that earlier elicitation of individuals’ entire distribution of claiming ages 
and Figure 9 replicates the training example which we included at that time.  As a result 
of these two elicitations – one without the reform scenario and one with the reform 
scenario – we have a prior and a posterior distribution for every respondents’ subjective 
distribution of expected Social Security claiming ages.  We use this information in two 
ways.  First, we asses the aggregate response to the timing of Social Security claiming in 
the population. Second, we compute how much individual annual Social Security benefits 
change after taking into account that respondents might work longer and claim later. 
 13 
 
3.1   Aggregate effect on the timing of Social Security claiming 
  We compute the average distribution of claiming ages in the population with and 
without reform by averaging the number of balls in each bin over all respondents.  We 
also include those respondents who indicated that they would definitely not claim Social 
Security later by assigning them as the post-reform distribution of possible claiming ages 
the same distribution that they gave when asked for their distribution without reform.  In 
Figure 10 we have converted these population distributions into cumulative distributions.  
The posterior distribution is located to the right of the prior distribution implying that at a 
population level respondents have shifted their expected timing of claiming towards 
claiming later.  Integrating over the area between the two distributions yields the size of 
the aggregate response which amounts to a difference of 1.13 years in total.  This implies 
that on average a 30 percent cut in Social Security benefits would prompt people to claim 
Social Security 1.13 years later.   
  One question arises with respect to the group that said “Maybe” to the option of 
claiming Social Security benefits later.  What did they assume when allocating the balls 
across the bins to indicate their revised distribution of expected claiming ages?  Did they 
provide the distribution conditional on the event that they might postpone claiming so 
that we would need to know the chances that they would postpone for deriving the 
unconditional distribution or did they provide the unconditional distribution in the first 
place?  The question wording gave no indication that they should have given the 
conditional distribution.  To shed light into this issue we compared the posterior 
distribution of those who said “Definitely Yes” to that of those who said “Maybe.”  We 
find that the posterior distribution of the Yes’s is substantially further to the right of the 
posterior distribution of the Maybes.  We take this to suggest that respondents who 
answered “Maybe” did provide the unconditional distribution which is what we assumed 
when constructing the aggregate distribution in Figure 10. 
 
3.2   Impact on Respondents’ Annual Social Security Benefit 
  The vast majority of workers claims Social Security at the same time as they retire 
from their job.  Assuming that claiming Social Security later would also imply working 14 
 
longer by the same length of time, respondents would increase their Social Security 
benefits due to two effects: 
-  additional earnings entering the calculations of their benefits; 
-  a smaller early claiming penalty or a higher delayed claiming credit. 
The size of the benefit increase due to additional earnings will vary across individuals 
due to differences in their earnings histories.  For about half the sample we are able to 
link respondents’ data to their Social Security earnings records allowing us to assess the 
impact additional earnings would have on their benefits.  Applying the exact Social 
Security formula to respondents’ earnings histories we compute each respondents’ Social 
Security benefit for each potential claiming age and weight the result by the respondents’ 
subjective probability distribution of possible claiming ages using the prior distribution 
(i.e. without reform).  This gives us the annual Social Security benefit the respondent 
would expect to receive without the reform scenario.  In a second calculation we reduce 
the Social Security benefit associated with each claiming age by 30 percent and weight 
these applying the posterior distribution of expected claiming ages (i.e., the distribution 
respondents gave under the Social Security reform scenario).  This gives us the annual 
Social Security benefit would expect to receive with the reform scenario.  We use the 
individuals’ expected annual Social Security benefit with and without reform to compute 
the change ((SS with reform – SS without reform) / SS without reform ).  Respondents 
who said they would definitely not delay claiming Social Security benefits are assigned a 
change of minus 30 percent.  Averaging this change over the entire population (and not 
just those who considered delaying claiming) we find that individuals’ annual Social 
Security benefit would be 20 percent lower on average once we take into account their 
response to the reform.  In other words, individuals’ response of working longer and 
claiming later would make up for about one third of the initial 30 percent cut in benefits.  
However, this average masks the substantial heterogeneity in the population. Table 9 
shows the deciles of the distribution of changes in annual Social Security benefits in the 
population.  These span from minus 30 percent for those who said they would definitely 




4  Conclusions 
  Using stated preferences data we analyze what individuals in their 50s and 60s 
say they would do if everyone’s Social Security benefits were cut by 30 percent. In 
particular, we investigate whether individuals would work longer or reduce spending or 
both.  More than 75 percent of our respondents report that they would definitely adjust 
their behavior in case of a benefit cut.  About a third report that they would only reduce 
spending, while another third report that they would do both work longer and reduce 
spending.  About 9 percent would only consider working longer as a response to the cut 
in benefits. 
   There is substantial heterogeneity in the response by sex, marital status, education 
and wealth.  Being male, living in a couple or being younger than 54 are associated with 
a significantly lower willingness to commit (i.e. say “definitely yes”) to reducing 
spending, while having an education at high school level or less and being in the lowest 
wealth tertile are associated with a higher willingness to commit to reducing spending. 
Being in the lowest Social Security Wealth tertile and the lowest tertile for other wealth 
and being single are associated with a higher willingness to commit to working longer. 
    Analyzing respondents’ answers regarding delaying their claiming of Social 
Security benefits, we find that Social Security claiming would be postponed by 1.13 
years on average in response to a 30 percent Social Security benefit cut.  Working longer 
and claiming Social Security later would compensate partially for the loss in benefits. We 
find that respondents would experience on average a 20 percent drop rather than the 30 
percent drop in the annual benefits.   
  The results of this study provide unique information on individuals’ responses to a 
Social Security reform that would implement a cut of 30 percent of benefits. Note 
however that we observe variation in the strength of individuals’ responses as a function 
of their subjective probability of the chances that their own Social Security benefits 
would be cut some time over the next ten years.  Respondents who give a high subjective 
probability for this event are more likely to commit to working longer and reducing 
spending.  It is possible that respondents with lower subjective probabilities for the event 
of Social Security reform cutting their own benefits would respond more strongly should 
this event occur in real life than indicated by their responses in our survey in the context 16 
 
of a hypothetical situation.  Should this be the case then our results would be 
underestimates of the full response in the population. 17 
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Figure 1:  Main Screen from the Internet survey asking about individuals’ responses to a  
      30 percent Social Security benefit cut 
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Figure 6:   
 
 
Marginal Effect of subj. prob. that own SS will be 

































Expected Social Security Claiming Age: 
























Table 1:  Sample Characteristics 
 
Variable  HRS Core 2006,  
No Social Security 
Internet eligible, 
No Social Security 
Stated preference 
sample 
  N=5529 N=3355 N=1020 
Age in July 2007  58.111  57.985  57.357 
Male  0.487 0.474 0.476 
Years of education  13.593  14.518  14.558 
Wealth  Quartile 2.561 2.808 2.795 
Work for pay (core)  0.783  0.831  0.863 
Work for pay, HRS 
Internet data 





Table 2:  Item non-response on main stated preference questions, in percent 
 
  Currently Working for Pay   
 Yes  No  All 
Working  longer  1.0 0.0 0.8 
Claim Social Security later  1.8  1.1  1.7 
Reduce spending before retirement  2.0  2.8  2.2 






  Claim Social Security later   
Work longer  Definitely YES  MAYBE  Definitely NO  All 
Definitely 
YES 47.3  43.9  8.8  100.0 
    82.0 27.9 19.2  38.3 
MAYBE  7.4 79.6 13.1  100.0 
    16.4 64.9 36.3  49.1 
Definitely  NO  2.9 34.6 62.5  100.0 
   1.6  7.2  44.5  12.6 
Total  22.1 60.2 17.7  100.0 




Table 4:  
 
Before After  retirement:   
Retirement: reduce  spending   
spend less 
Definitely 
YES MAYBE  Definitely  NO  All 
 296  43  1  340 
Definitely 
YES 87.1  12.7  0.3  100 
 58.4  15.4  2.8  41.3 
   36  5.2  0.1  41.3 
 197  209  13  419 
MAYBE 47  49.9  3.1  100 
 38.9  74.6  36.1  50.9 
   23.9  25.4  1.6  50.9 
 14  28  22  64 
Definitely NO  21.9  43.8  34.4  100 
 2.8  10  61.1  7.8 
   1.7  3.4  2.7  7.8 
 507  280  36  823 
Total 61.6  34  4.4  100 
 100  100  100  100 















= 1 if Definitely YES to ↓
spending before 
retirement or ↓ spending 
after retirement.





= 1 if Definitely YES to work longer or claim 
SS later
“Work longer” dimension:
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Table 6:  Distribution of Responses to Working Longer and Reducing Spending,  
      reduced dimensionality 
 
   Work longer   
   
= 1 if YES to work longer  
or claim SS later   




Reduce  Spending 
= 1 if YES to 
Reduce spending 
before or after retirement 
 
0 196 78  274 
 71.5  28.5  100.0 
 40.9  22.4  33.1 
   23.7  9.4  33.1 
  283 271  554 
1 51.1 48.9  100.0 
 59.1  77.7  66.9 
   34.2  32.7  66.9 
   479  349  828 
All 57.9 42.2  100.0 
 100.0  100.0  100.0 





Table 7:   
 
  Working   Not working 
Commit to neither  23.7  38.6 
Work longer  9.4  4.0 
Spend less  34.2  42.1 
Work longer & spend less  32.7  15.3 




Table 8:  Bivariate Probit 
 
  Work longer  Reduce spending 
 Right-hand variables  Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value
  
Male 0.052 0.623 -0.205  0.058
Couple -0.512 0.000 -0.287  0.046
Age <54  0.078 0.528 -0.246  0.054
55-59 (ref) (ref) 
60 or older  0.180 0.135 0.027  0.829
Spouse's age   
> 1 year younger  0.315 0.021 0.058  0.671
within one year  (ref) (ref) 
> 1 year older  0.211 0.117 0.268  0.051
High school or less  -0.025 0.834 0.356  0.005
Some college  -0.003 0.975 0.098  0.374
College or more  (ref) (ref) 
Social Security Wealth   
Lowest tertile  0.219 0.063 0.033  0.784
Second tertile  0.099 0.371 0.087  0.444
Highest tertile  (ref) (ref) 
Other Wealth   
Lowest tertile  0.379 0.002 0.263  0.037
Second tertile  0.118 0.270 0.159  0.143
Highest tertile  (ref) (ref) 
Own health: fair or poor  -0.242 0.187 -0.070  0.712
Spouse's health: fair or poor  -0.063 0.706 -0.128  0.450
Probability own SS benefits cut   
< 50 %  (ref) (ref) 
= 50%  -0.047 0.689 0.170  0.154
> 50 %  0.176 0.110 0.372  0.001
Constant -0.267 0.076 0.262  0.092
Number of observations = 826       







Table 9:  Distribution of changes in annual Social Security Benefit taking into account  













N= 353   
Mean  = -0.205 
 